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THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE
PRESSURE AND LIABILITY REFORMS
ON PHYSICIANS’ PERCEPTIONS OF
MEDICAL CARE
DANIEL P. KESSLER* AND MARK B. MCCLELLAN**
I
INTRODUCTION
The medical malpractice liability system has two main purposes.1 First, it
seeks to provide compensation to patients who suffer negligent medical injury,
thereby acting as a source of insurance.2 Second, it seeks to penalize physicians
whose negligence causes patient injury, thereby providing the incentives to take
appropriate precautions in medical treatment.3
However, considerable evidence suggests that the current system accomplishes neither of these objectives. Regarding the first, the tort system does not
provide compensation rapidly or equitably to injured patients. Justice for
medical malpractice claimants is subject to lengthy delays: On average, it takes
four to five years to resolve a malpractice claim.4 In addition, while one in fifteen patients who suffer an injury due to medical negligence receive compensation, only one-sixth of the cases that receive compensation have positive evidence of negligent medical injury.5
The performance of the liability system in terms of the second objective deCopyright © 1997 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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1. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1985).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 26 tbl.2.4 (1993). The referenced time period for claim resolution is from incident to disposition. See id.
5. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 139 (1993); HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION
IN NEW YORK, exec. summary 6 (1990).
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pends on the extent to which the system induces physicians to take socially appropriate precautions against medical injuries. Because precautionary medical
care is costly, it is not in society’s interest as a whole to establish a malpractice
system that requires physicians to utilize every available medical technology in
the treatment of every patient for whom that technology offers even the slimmest of health benefits.6 Instead, as first outlined by Learned Hand in U.S. vs.
Carroll Towing, the socially optimal level of precaution against accidental injury will be obtained when the liability system punishes defendants that take
less care than that level at which the marginal social benefits from additional
precaution, in terms of improved patient health, are exactly equal to the marginal social costs. 7
In theory, the existing medical malpractice liability system may or may not
provide physicians with the incentives to take the optimal level of precautions.
On one hand, malpractice penalties optimally may deter physicians and other
health care providers from putting patients at excessive risk of adverse health
outcomes. The malpractice system may affect physician behavior even though
virtually all physicians are insured against the financial consequences of malpractice in the form of legal damages;8 physicians may be motivated to take
care to avoid nonfinancial penalties of malpractice claims such as reputational
harm and the time and unpleasantness of defending a claim.9 To the extent that
managed care encourages physicians to reduce treatment intensity, the malpractice system may be an important counterweight for preserving patient access to necessary care.10
On the other hand, these penalties may drive physicians to be “too careful”—to practice defensive medicine. Because of third-party payers, such as
patients’ health care plans and insurance, neither patients nor physicians bear a
substantial share of the costs of medical care associated with precaution in any
particular case. Accordingly, very small increases in the expected “hassle”
from a malpractice claim or lawsuit may result in large increases in medical
treatment intensity that, at the margin, generate only minimal health benefits.11
6. See DANZON, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 120-24 (discussing optimal levels of prevention).
7. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947).
8. See, e.g., Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physician Perceptions of the Risk of Being Sued, 17 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 463, 476 (1992); Frank A. Sloan, Experience Rating: Does It Make Sense for
Medical Malpractice Insurance?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 128 (1990).
9. See, e.g., WEILER ET AL., supra note 5, at 18; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 7 (1993) [hereinafter
OTA].
10. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Moral Hazard, Managed Care, and Defensive
Medicine (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
11. Socially excessive precaution and defensive medicine can take many forms. When physicians
avoid high-risk patients or procedures to the detriment of patient health, they are practicing negative
defensive medicine. When physicians engage in precautionary treatment with minimal expected medical benefit relative to the cost of the treatment, they are practicing positive defensive medicine.
Hereinafter, we use the generic term “defensive medicine” to refer exclusively to positive defensive
medicine. See David Klingman et al., Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Scenario Surveys,
21 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 185, 189 (1996).
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In previous research, we found that the existing liability system provides
physicians with incentives to practice defensive medicine.12 We tested for the
existence and assessed the magnitude of defensive treatment behavior by calculating the cost of an additional year of life or an additional year of cardiac
health achieved through malpractice-pressure-induced treatment intensity.13 If
liability-induced precaution were resulting in low expenditures per year of life
saved relative to generally accepted costs per year of life saved of other medical
treatments, then the existing liability system would be providing incentives for
efficient care; but if liability-induced precaution were resulting in high expenditures per year of life saved, then the liability system would be providing incentives for socially excessive care.14 Because we found that reductions in medical
malpractice tort liability lead to reductions in the intensity of medical treatment but not to increases in adverse health outcomes, we concluded that medical care for cardiac illness is defensive.15
The social costs of defensive medicine are likely to be large, indeed far
larger than the “direct” social costs of the liability system. The direct total costs
of the system (for example, the costs of compensating claimants and plaintiffs,
the time of the parties, attorneys’ and experts’ fees, salaries of judges, and
other court costs) are less than one percent of all health care expenditures.16
Furthermore, because compensation paid to claimants and plaintiffs is a transfer rather than a real consumption of resources, the true direct social costs of
the system are even smaller. The indirect costs of the system—those attributable to defensive treatment—are estimated to be much greater. For example,
our previous research estimates the share of medical expenditures on hospital
services for elderly patients with cardiac illness attributable to defensive practices to be approximately five to nine percent.17 Broader analyses suggest that
the share of aggregate medical expenditures spent on defensive behavior may
be even greater.18
For these reasons, further research into the causes of defensive medicine
can guide reforms of the medical malpractice liability system. To do so, such
12. See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111
Q.J. ECON. 353, 388 (1996). In that study, we used longitudinal data on all elderly Medicare recipients
hospitalized for treatment of cardiac illness in 1984, 1987, and 1990, matched with information on tort
laws and law reforms from the state in which the patient was treated. See id. at 354. We studied the
effect of liability-reducing law reforms on total hospital expenditures on the patient in the year after
the initial hospitalization to measure intensity of treatment; we also modeled the effect of law reforms
on several important patient health outcomes. See id. at 361-66. We compared trends in expenditures
and outcomes for patients from states adopting liability-reducing tort reforms to those for patients
from states that did not adopt tort reforms. See id. at 372-87.
13. See id. at 378-79.
14. See id. at 355.
15. See id. at 388.
16. See OTA, supra note 9, at 5.
17. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 383.
18. See, e.g., Roger A. Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA
2776, 2781 (1987); see also James W. Moser & Robert A. Musacchio, The Cost of Medical Professional
Liability in the 1980s, 7 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 6, 7-9 (1991)(discussing the findings of Roger Reynolds,
supra).
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research needs to focus on the relationships between liability laws, malpractice
pressure, physician perceptions, medical treatment decisions, medical costs,
and health outcomes in order to investigate how and why doctors practice defensive medicine. To investigate how doctors practice defensive medicine, we
estimated separately the impact of liability reforms on diagnostic and therapeutic medical expenditures.19 To investigate why doctors practice defensive medicine, we identified the effect of liability reforms on outcomes of the legal system and physician incentives to practice defensively, and the extent to which
law-induced changes in different types of incentives actually affect medical
costs and patient health outcomes.20 In another research project, we modeled
the role of physician and hospital moral hazard due to health insurance,21 and
we estimated the impact of managed care and the interaction between managed care and liability reform on treatment decisions, health care costs, and
health outcomes.22
In this paper, we use repeated cross-sections of the American Medical Association Socioeconomic Monitoring System (“AMA SMS”) survey that reported physicians’ experiences from 1984 through 1993, 23 matched with data on
state liability reforms, to examine the relationship between liability reforms,
malpractice pressure, and physician perceptions of medical care. We estimate
the impact of reforms on trends over time both in measures of malpractice
pressure (such as malpractice claims rates and malpractice insurance premiums) and in physician perceptions of the importance of malpractice-pressureinduced changes in practice patterns.
In addition, we seek to validate physicians’ reported perceptions as a meas19. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Preliminary results from this study suggest that liability reforms reduce the prevalence of defensive medicine by reducing both financial and nonfinancial
dimensions of malpractice pressure. See id. States adopting “direct” reforms, see infra Part III.A.,
showed lower trend growth in each measure of malpractice pressure that we studied—the frequency of
malpractice claims, the likelihood of delay in claim resolution, the likelihood of high settlement
amounts, and the likelihood of costly litigation—relative to nonadopting states. Reform-induced reductions in each dimension of malpractice pressure reduced growth in medical treatment intensity for
elderly patients with cardiac illness, but did not systematically lead to increases in trends in adverse
health outcomes. See id.
20. See id.
21. For a discussion of physician and hospital moral hazard due to health insurance, see CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH
REFORM 13-15 (1995).
22. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 10.
23. CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AMA, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE 1994 app. A at 163 (Martin L. Gonzalez ed., 1994). The AMA SMS surveys provide representative information on the population of all nonfederal physicians, excluding residents,
who spend the greatest proportion of their time in patient care activities. Samples of the SMS are selected from the AMA Physician Masterfile, which contains current and historical information on every
M.D. in the United States. See id. The AMA SMS core questionnaire includes questions on practice
characteristics, hours and numbers of patient visits, fees, income and expenses, third-party payors and
their characteristics, and specialty-specific fees and procedures. See id. at 164, app. C at 172-75. In
addition, the AMA SMS includes periodic supplemental surveys to provide information on special
topics such as malpractice. Properties of the AMA SMS are discussed below, see infra Part II.B. For
more detailed information about the SMS, see AMA, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
MEDICAL PRACTICE (1984-1994).
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ure of actual changes in practices by estimating the joint impact of liability reforms and individual physician malpractice claims history on physician perceptions. Evidence that state-level reforms both reduce measures of malpractice
pressure and reduce physician perceptions of the impact of malpractice pressure would suggest that survey methods provide valid measures of defensive
practices. On the other hand, if physicians’ perceptions depend only on their
individual experiences and not on exogenous variation in malpractice pressure
due to law reforms, then physician surveys may primarily be capturing negative
feelings about the malpractice system or other unmodeled differences across
physicians, rather than the impact of malpractice pressure on perceptions and
practices.
The paper proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the problem of measuring defensive medicine, sets out our research approach, and examines the role
of physician surveys. Part III presents our models and outlines our analysis of
the AMA SMS survey. Part IV presents our empirical results, and Part V presents our conclusions.
II
MEASURING DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND PHYSICIAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE
IMPACT OF THE MALPRACTICE SYSTEM ON MEDICAL CARE
Figure 1 outlines our schematic of the process by which the tort system affects medical care. Statutes and judicial decisions—the rules of the tort system—are at the base of the process. Tort law affects outcomes of the legal system such as the frequency of claims, the amount of time and physician effort
needed to resolve a claim, and the size of the award. We use the term
“malpractice pressure” to describe the extent to which a state’s legal environment provides high benefits to plaintiffs or high costs to physicians, or both.
Malpractice pressure may be multidimensional and include both financial and
nonfinancial factors. Malpractice pressure may affect physician perceptions of
appropriate practices. Changes in perceived best practices may then translate
into changes in actual treatment decisions. Finally, changes in treatment decisions may translate into changes in medical costs and possibly patient health.
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FIGURE 1
THE IMPACT OF THE LIABILITY SYSTEM ON MEDICAL CARE

Medical Liability Laws

↓

How do liability laws affect “malpractice pressure”—
financial and nonfinancial outcomes of the legal system?

Malpractice Awards and
Litigation

↓

How does malpractice pressure affect physician perceptions of appropriate medical practices?

Physician Perceptions of
Best Practices

↓

How do malpractice-pressure-induced changes in perceptions affect treatment decisions and medical costs?

Treatment Decisions,
Medical Costs

↓
Patient Health
Outcomes

Do treatment decisions made to avoid legal liability
have an effect on health outcomes?
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Physician surveys focus on the second link in the chain—the effect of malpractice pressure on physician perceptions of appropriate practices. Surveys
generally take one of two forms: “direct” and “clinical scenario” surveys. Direct surveys generally ask doctors how the incentives provided by the malpractice system affect their practices. The AMA SMS survey, for example, asks,
“What percentage of the diagnostic tests and treatment procedures ordered
were due to concerns about malpractice?”24 Clinical scenario surveys, on the
other hand, posit hypothetical clinical situations and ask physicians what they
would do and why, sometimes providing a list of potential behavioral explanations including “malpractice concerns.”25 Direct surveys find that physicians
report substantial changes in practice patterns as a result of malpractice pressure, changes that could account for as much as fifteen percent of spending on
physician services.26 Clinical scenario surveys also find that defensive medicine
exists, although not to the extent suggested by the direct physician surveys.27
Surveys offer both fundamental strengths and weaknesses relative to other
methods of measuring the prevalence of defensive medicine. The fundamental
strength of surveys is that they focus on physicians’ perceptions of the impact of
the malpractice system, which may be important determinants of medical practice. The fundamental weakness of surveys is that they cannot assess whether
physicians’ behavioral responses to liability pressure are socially optimal or socially wasteful. Surveys may calibrate the social costs imposed by the liability
system, but because they do not assess the impact of liability-induced treatment
on patient health, they cannot measure the social benefits that the system may
create.
In addition to this fundamental weakness, the existing survey literature has
other shortcomings stemming from its relatively narrow focus on the relationship between malpractice pressure and physician perceptions.28 First and foremost, surveys are prone to response bias. This problem may be particularly
acute in direct physician surveys, in which physicians may be tempted to exaggerate the impact of malpractice pressure in order to buttress a political argument in favor of liability reform.29 Indeed, physicians estimate the probability
of defending against a malpractice claim in any one year at about three times
the actual probability of such a claim arising.30 Clinical scenario surveys may
avoid some of these problems, but the specification of a list of explanations for
24. AMA SMS, 1993 Core Survey Codebook.
25. Klingman et al., supra note 11, at 193-94.
26. See, e.g., Sara C. Charles et al., Physicians on Trial—Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice
Trials, 148 W.J. MED. 358, 358-60 (1988); Ann G. Lawthers et al., supra note 8, at 478; Moser &
Musacchio, supra note 18, at 7-9; Reynolds et al., supra note 18, at 2776; Margo L. Rosenbach & Ashley G. Stone, Malpractice Insurance Costs and Physician Practice, 1983-1986, 9 HEALTH AFF. 176, 18285 (Winter 1990). A comprehensive review of these studies can be found in U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, OTA-H-602,
ch. 3 (1994) [hereinafter OTA].
27. See, e.g., OTA supra note 26, at 56.
28. See, e.g., id.; Klingman et al., supra note 11, at 191.
29. See Klingman et al., supra note 11, at 191.
30. See Lawthers et al., supra note 8, at 463.
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a treatment decision inevitably raises similar concerns.31
A second criticism is that previous studies using survey data have provided
evidence only on the baseline level of treatment behavior undertaken out of liability concerns, not on the incremental response of defensive behavior to specific policy reforms. Because some treatments undertaken out of liability concerns may improve health, estimates of the total effect of malpractice liability
on medical costs necessarily overstate the costs of defensive medicine. For
purposes of policy evaluation, research should consider both the medical costs
and the health benefits of changes in treatment behavior attributable to proposed changes in the liability system.
Third, unobserved differences in the characteristics of patients or health
care providers means that reported correlations between malpractice pressure
and behavioral change may be noncausal. A provider reporting high levels of
malpractice pressure and high levels of liability-induced treatment may be responding to tort incentives. Alternatively, such a provider may have adopted
relatively intensive treatment patterns and have suffered from frequent claims
and high insurance premiums as a result of other underlying factors, such as
having patients with a high level of disease severity or unusually high expectations for medical interventions and health outcomes. In this case, the apparent
association between malpractice pressure and behavioral change would not
represent the causal impact of the liability system, but rather the effects of the
underlying, unobserved factors affecting both legal system outcomes and physician attitudes or behavior.
Despite these concerns, no previous research has sought to expand analysis
of survey data to include other aspects of the relationship between liability law
and medical care. We address here the key criticisms of the survey literature
by linking survey data with data on state liability reforms and with measures of
malpractice pressure, such as malpractice claim rates and malpractice insurance
premiums. We estimate the extent to which exogenous law reforms affect malpractice pressure and physician perceptions of defensive medicine to provide
policy-relevant evidence on the marginal, causal impact of reforms. In addition, we investigate the hypothesis of response bias by estimating the joint impact of liability reforms and individual physician malpractice claims history on
physician perceptions. Evidence that state-level reforms reduce both malpractice pressure and physician perceptions of the incidence of defensive medicine
would suggest that survey methods provide valid measures of defensive practices. If physicians’ perceptions depend only on their individual experiences
and not on exogenous variation in malpractice pressure due to law reforms,
then physician surveys may be capturing negative feelings about the malpractice system, or unobserved differences across physicians, rather than the impact
of malpractice pressure on perceptions and practice patterns.

31. See Klingman et al., supra note 11, at 192.
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III
MODELS AND DATA
A. Models
We developed statistical models that measure the effects of changes in
medical liability laws on changes in malpractice pressure and in physician perceptions of liability-induced treatment intensity. Restated, we compare differences in time trends between states that enacted liability-reducing reforms and
states that did not. Although this modeling strategy neglects the vast commonality between states in their malpractice systems, and therefore cannot assess
the total social costs (or social benefits) that may result from the U.S. malpractice system, it offers several advantages. Most importantly, it provides policyrelevant assessments of the incremental response of defensive behavior to specific legal reforms. In addition, by basing our estimates on differences in time
trends, we estimate the effects of laws while controlling for fixed differences
between states and fixed differences over time.32
We observe successive cohorts of physicians over the 1984-93 period. In
state s = 1, … , S during year t = 1, … , T, our observational units consist of individual physicians i = 1, … , Nst. Each physician has specialty Xist, described by
a set of fourteen indicator variables (there are fifteen specialty categories in
our data).33 We analyze two measures of the malpractice pressure facing each
physician. First, the physician may have malpractice claims filed against her in
year t, which we denote with a claims indicator variable Cist: Cist = 1 if physician i
from state s had at least one malpractice claim filed against her in year t, and
Cist = 0 otherwise. Second, the physician pays or has paid on her behalf annual
malpractice insurance premiums Mist, which we consistently express in the value
of 1985 dollars. Physicians also report perceptions about the impact of malpractice pressure on four dimensions of their practices: record-keeping, use of
diagnostic tests, referrals for consultation, and time spent with patients. We
R
D
characterize these reported perceptions with four indicator variables Pist , Pist ,
C
T
x
Pist , and Pist , respectively, where Pist = 1 if the physician reported that she
changed that dimension of her treatment behavior in response to malpractice
x
pressure, and Pist = 0 otherwise.
Table 1 summaries the eight types of state medical malpractice liability law
reforms that we analyze: caps on damage awards, abolition of punitive damages, no mandatory prejudgment interest, collateral source rule reforms (which
require damages to be reduced by all or part of the dollar value of collateralsource payments to the plaintiff), caps on contingency fees, mandatory periodic
payments, joint-and-several liability reform, and the existence of a patient
32. This would be important if there were fixed differences across geographic areas in attitudes
toward the tort system that were correlated with laws. For a discussion of the potential importance of
fixed differences in areas’ legal cultures, see Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1094, 1128-29 (1996).
33. Indicator variables are assigned the values zero or one.
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compensation fund. Consistent with our other research34 and with previous research on the impact of medical malpractice liability reform,35 we group these
reforms into two categories: direct and indirect reforms. Direct reforms include changes in laws that specify statutory limits on, or reductions in, malpractice awards: caps on total or noneconomic damages, collateral-source rule reforms, abolition of punitive damages, and abolition of mandatory prejudgment
interest. Indirect reforms include changes that affect awards only indirectly,
such as reforms imposing mandatory periodic payments (requiring damages in
certain cases to be disbursed in the form of an annuity), caps on attorneys’ contingency fees, and abolition of joint-and-several liability for total or
noneconomic damages, either for all claims or for claims in which defendants
did not act in concert. We denote the existence of law reforms in state s at time
t using two indicator variables, L1st and L2st. If state s has adopted a direct reform at time t, L1st= 1, and if state s has adopted an indirect reform at time t,
L2st=1. The variable Lst = [L1st L2st] is thus a two-dimensional binary vector describing the existence of malpractice reforms.

34. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 10; Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 360, 363, 37072; Kessler & McClellan, supra note 19.
35. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (RAND R-2870-ICJ/HCFA, 1982); PATRICIA M. DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON
THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS, (RAND R-3410-ICJ, 1986);
Drucilla K. Barker, The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 17 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 143 (1992); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms
on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L.
663 (1989); S. Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167 (1990).
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TABLE 1
LEGAL REFORMS USED IN ANALYSIS
Reform

Description Of Reform

Caps On Damage
Awards

Either Noneconomic (Pain And Suffering)
Or Total Damages Payable Are Capped At
A Statutorily-Specified Dollar Amount
Abolition Of
Medical Malpractice Defendants Are Not
Punitive Damages Liable For Punitive Damages Under Any
Circumstances
No Mandatory
Interest On Either Noneconomic Or Total
Damages Accruing From Either The Date
Prejudgment
Of The Injury Or The Date Of Filing Of
Interest
The Lawsuit Is Not Mandatory
Collateral-Source Total Damages Payable In A Malpractice
Rule Reform
Tort Are Statutorily Reduced By All Or
Part Of The Dollar Value Of Collateral
Source Payments To The Plaintiff
Caps On ContinThe Proportion Of An Award That A Plaingency Fees
tiff Can Contractually Agree To Pay A
Contingency-Fee Attorney Is Capped At A
Statutorily-Specified Level
Mandatory PeriPart Or All Of Damages Must Be Disodic Payments
bursed In The Form Of An Annuity That
Pays Out Over Time
Joint-And-Several Joint And Several Liability Is Abolished
Liability Reform
For Noneconomic Or Total Damages, Either For All Claims Or For Claims In Which
Defendants Did Not Act In Concert
Patient
Doctors Receive GovernmentAdministered Excess Malpractice Liability
Compensation
Insurance, Generally Financed Through A
Fund
Tax On Malpractice Insurance Premiums

Predicted Impact
On Liability
Direct

Direct

Direct

Direct

Indirect

Indirect

Indirect

Indirect

Our basic model therefore specifies each of the two measures of malpractice pressure as a function of state-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects, specialty indicator variables, and liability reforms as follows:
C ist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ m + vist ,

(1)

where t is a time fixed-effect, s is a state fixed-effect,  is a vector of the corresponding average-effect estimates for specialty controls, m is the two-
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dimensional average effect of malpractice reforms on the growth in claims rates
or malpractice insurance premiums, and vist is a mean-zero independentlydistributed error term with E(vist | Xist, Lst,) = 0. Because the impact of law reforms on premiums is likely to be proportional,36 we estimate the impact of reforms on the natural logarithm of the physicians’ annual malpractice premiums
ln(Mist) rather than on Mist. In addition, because insurance premiums in a state
at a point in time depend on historical levels of malpractice pressure in the
state,37 we allow the estimated time-fixed-effects t to vary in reforming and
nonreforming states in models of ln(Mist).
Because insurance premiums depend on historical levels of malpractice
pressure, and because reforms generally affect only claims arising from injuries
occurring after adoption, the full impact of reforms on insurance premiums and
claim rates may not be immediate. For this reason, we also estimate the oneyear and three-year lagged impact of reforms. Specifically, we modify the basic
-1
-3
-1
model (1) by substituting Lst and Lst for Lst, where each element of Lst = 1 if
state s had adopted a reform (direct or indirect, as applicable) in year t - 1, and
-3
similarly, each element of Lst = 1 if state s had adopted a reform (again, direct
or indirect, as applicable) in year t - 3.
We also estimate two closely-related variants of the basic model (1). First,
we estimate the impact of reforms on malpractice pressure by specialty, interacting the law reform indicator variables Lst with an indicator variable OBist = 1
if physician i was an obstetrician or gynecologist (OB/Gyn), to investigate
whether liability reform has a greater impact on physician specialties traditionally thought to be high-malpractice-risk, as follows:38
OB
C ist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ m + OBist * L st φ m + vist .

(1a)

Second, using linear probability models, we estimate the impact of reforms on
physician perceptions:

Pist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ m + v ist .
x

(1’)

We also estimate models of the impact of reforms that group direct and indirect reforms together. These models estimate the effect of a unidimensional
liability indicator variable Lst, where Lst = 1 if state s at time t had adopted either a direct or an indirect reform, and zero otherwise. Model (2’) is identical
to model (1’) except for this difference:

P ist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ + vist ,
x

(2’)

36. See, e.g., Zuckerman et al., supra note 35. Results were qualitatively similar for models substituting Mist for ln(Mist).
37. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 146-62 (1991).
38. We follow Zuckerman et al., supra note 35, at 170, by examining OB/Gyn physicians separately as an example of a high-malpractice-risk specialty.
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whereas model (2a’) identifies the unidimensional impact of reform on physician perception by specialty:
x
Pist =θ t +α s + X ist β + Lst φ + OBist * Lst φ + vist .
OB

(2a’)

Models (3’) and (4’) estimate the joint effect of individual physicians’ malpractice claims rates and unidimensional measures of law reforms on perceptions of malpractice-pressure-induced changes in treatment, to investigate the
validity of physician surveys. Model (3’) uses the claims indicator variable Cist
to measure malpractice claims rates, defining γ as the effect of claims rates on
perceptions:
x
Pist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ + C ist γ + vist ,

(3’)

whereas model (4’) uses in place of Cist an indicator variable CEist, where CEist =
1 if physician i ever had a malpractice claim filed against her, and zero otherwise. Model (3a’) identifies the impact of claims rates and the unidimensional
impact of reform on physician perception by whether a physician had a malpractice claim against her last year:
c
x
P ist = θ t + α s + X ist β + L st φ + C ist γ + C ist * L st φ m + v ist .

(3a’)

Model (4a’) is defined analogously to model (3a’), with CEist substituted for
Cist to identify a similar impact based on whether a physician has ever had a
malpractice claim against her.
B. Data
The data used in our analysis come from two principal sources. Our data on
liability reforms are taken directly from our previous research,39 updated to include adoption and repeal of reforms through 1993. Table 2 presents the chronology of legal reforms through 1993 that we analyze for each of the fifty states.
The table shows that a number of states have implemented legal reforms at different times. For example, twenty-three states adopted direct reforms over the
course of our 1984 to 1993 study period; twenty-four states adopted indirect reforms. Furthermore, a substantial number of states do not overlap in their
adoption of policies; although thirty-three states adopted either direct or indirect reforms, only fourteen adopted both.

39. Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 372-75.
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TABLE 2
CHRONOLOGY OF LEGAL REFORMS THROUGH 1993*
Year Effective

Year Effective

Direct

Indirect

State

Reform

Reform

Alabama

1987

1987

Alaska

1976, ‘86

1989

Nebraska

1960, ‘76

1988

Nevada

Arizona
Arkansas

Direct

Indirect

State

Reform

Reform

Montana

1987
1976

New Hampshire

1986++

California

1975

1975, ‘86

New Jersey

1987

1972, ‘76

Colorado

1986

1986, ‘88

New Mexico

1976

1976, ‘87

Connecticut

1985

1986

New York

1967, ‘84

1970, ‘85

1976

North Carolina

1976, ‘86

1980, ‘85, ‘86

North Dakota

Delaware
Florida
Georgia

Ohio

Hawaii

1986

Idaho

1987, ‘90

1987

Oregon

Illinois

1976, ‘85

1985

Pennsylvania

Indiana

1975

1975, ‘85

Rhode Island

Iowa

1975

Kansas

1986, ‘88

1987
1975

Oklahoma

1953, ‘78
1975, ‘87

1974, ‘76

1976
1976

South Dakota

1976

1988

Tennessee

1975

1975

Louisiana

1975, **

1975, ‘84

Texas

1977, ‘92

Maine

1989

1985

Utah

1985, ‘86

Maryland

1986

Massachusetts

1986, **

1986

Michigan

1986

1981

Minnesota

1986

Vermont

Mississippi
Missouri

1986

1986

1975+, ‘87
1975

South Carolina

Kentucky

1988+++

1970

Virginia

1974

Washington

**

West Virginia

1986

Wisconsin

1986++

Wyoming

1985, ‘86

1986
1975, ‘86
1986, ‘87

*

Except prejudgment interest. Montana imposed prejudgment interest in 1985. No other states
repealed or imposed prejudgment interest in the years 1985-1993. The following states imposed
mandatory prejudgment interest effective before 1984: Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Utah, and West Virginia. Source: Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, tbl. IIB (updated through
1993 with authors’ research).
**
Common law effective before 1984 prohibits punitive damages.
+
Repealed 1987.
++ Held unconstitutional or expired, 1991.
+++ Held unconstitutional, 1993.

Our data on individual physicians are from the AMA SMS survey, a na-
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tionally-representative annual survey of approximately 4,000 physicians.40 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the AMA SMS variables used in analysis.41 All of the SMS surveys except the 1984 supplemental “perceptions” survey were conducted in the year following the activities and experiences about
which the survey inquired.42 For consistency, we categorize all survey responses
based on the year in which the relevant activities or experiences occurred, not
the year in which the question was asked. Because no information on physicians’ 1984 malpractice claims histories was collected by the core survey, the
base year for analysis of the full sample is 1985.
For the full sample, Table 3 presents means weighted with the AMA SMS
sampling weights; unweighted means are virtually identical. The leftmost three
columns of Table 3 provide data for the nine cross-sections of survey responses
from the 1985 through 1993 surveys. We use this data in models (1) and (1a) to
estimate the impact of reforms on malpractice pressure. The first nonblank
row of these columns shows that a significant fraction of physicians have malpractice claims filed against them in a given year—approximately eight percent—and that this number has been declining slightly over the 1985 to 1993
period.43 The next row of the table shows that between thirty-six and forty percent of physicians in our sample have ever had a malpractice claim filed against
them, and that the share of physicians who have ever had a claim filed against
them has risen over time. Real malpractice insurance premiums have also risen
over time, from an average of $10,504 in 1985 to an average of $11,101 in 1993
(both expressed in 1985 dollars), a real increase of approximately 5.7 percent.

40. See CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 23, app. A at 163.
41. Sample sizes in the table are less than 4,000 because some observations had missing data for
one or more variables used in analysis. See id.
42. See id.
43. Our calculated shares of physicians with claims is identical to those reported in Martin L.
Gonzalez, Medical Professional Liability Claims and Premiums, 1985-1993, in CENTER FOR HEALTH
POLICY RESEARCH, AMA, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 31, 33 tbl. 2
(1995).
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TABLE 3
MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF VARIABLES
USED IN ANALYSIS, AMA, SMS
Perceptions
Full Sample
Variable

1985

1993

Survey Sample
85-93 avg

1984

1992

Malpractice-Pressure-Induced (MP-I) Record Keeping (1 = yes)

0.3083

0.6501

M-P-I Diagnostic Tests

0.2004

0.7310

M-P-I Referrals For Consultation

0.1690

0.6284

M-P-I Time With Patients

0.1699

0.6734

Claims This Year (1 = yes)

0.0857

0.0783

0.0717

0.0819

0.0858

Ever Had Claims (1 = yes)

0.3606

0.3954

0.3773

0.3667

0.4372

Self-Employed (1 = yes)

0.4218

0.2989

0.3591

0.1681
0.1490

0.1232
0.1854

Annual Malpractice Insurance
Premiums
Specialty
General/Family Practice
Internal Medicine

$10,504

$11,101

$11,496

(11,229)

(18,947)

(15,371)

0.1611
0.1935

0.1331
0.2349

0.1478
0.2182

General Surgery

0.0646

0.0546

0.0595

0.0627

0.0603

Otolaryngology

0.0233

0.0174

0.0197

0.0209

0.0233

Orthopedic Surgery

0.0327

0.0413

0.0376

0.0305

0.0454

Ophthalmology

0.0373

0.0386

0.0396

0.0383

0.0431

Urological Surgery

0.0220

0.0172

0.0206

0.0166

0.0198

Other Surgery

0.0259

0.0235

0.0250

0.0235

0.0286

Pediatrics

0.0705

0.0773

0.0729

0.0801

0.0790

Obstetrics/Gynecology

0.0656

0.0652

0.0666

0.0810

0.0729

Psychology

0.0723

0.0683

0.0691

0.0889

0.0675

Radiology

0.0549

0.0537

0.0551

0.0784

0.0710

Anesthesiology

0.0488

0.0569

0.0530

0.0514

0.0576

Pathology

0.0254

0.0248

0.0245

0.0288

0.0347

Other Specialties

0.1020

0.0934

0.0907

0.0819

0.0881

3,847

3,941

34,870

1,148

2,621

N

Note: Means for full sample weighted using AMA SMS sampling weights. Malpractice insurance
premiums are reported in 1985 dollars for physicians with nonzero responses (1985: N = 2,764; 1993: N
= 2,873; 85-93: N = 29,871). Opinion survey questions in 1992 differ from questions in 1984. See supra
text accompanying notes 45-46.
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The rightmost two columns of Table 3 summarize the 1984 supplemental
and 1992 survey samples that contain physicians’ valid responses to questions
about their perceptions of malpractice pressure’s impact. Specifically, the
questions related to four dimensions of the physicians’ practices: recordkeeping, use of diagnostic tests, referrals for consultation, and time spent with
patients. We characterize reported perceptions with the four indicator varix
ables Pist described previously,44 which describe whether the physician reported
changing any of the four practice dimensions in response to malpractice pressure.
Unfortunately, these behavioral questions were not asked in exactly the
same way in the 1984 and 1992 surveys. In the 1984 surveys, physicians were
asked, “During the last 12 months, have you increased the number/amount of X
in response to the growth in malpractice claims, or not?,” where X represents
one of the four dimensions of practice.45 In the 1992 survey, physicians were
asked, “What percentage of X done in 1992 were due to concerns about malpractice?”46 Respondents who gave any nonzero answer were coded as altering
treatment behavior in response to malpractice concerns. Thus, the higher rates
of malpractice-sensitive behavior reported in 1992 are at least partly the result
of the modified question format from incremental changes in malpractice pressure and behavior to levels of malpractice pressure and behavior.
However, because our analysis relies on the differences between geographic
areas in trends in physicians’ responses, the format change will not lead to bias
in our results as long as the effect of the change in the questions’ terms on physicians is uncorrelated with individual physicians’ personal characteristics and
uncorrelated with geographic area. Put another way, because our analysis examines changes over time in survey responses of physicians from states adopting reforms relative to changes over time in responses of physicians from
nonadopting states, the effects of modifying a question that affects physicians
equally in expectation have no net impact on the results.
A substantial share of physicians reported that malpractice pressure has affected their practice in multiple dimensions.47 For example, in 1984, approximately seventeen percent of physicians reported that they had increased referrals for consultation and time spent with patients in response to malpractice
pressure; twenty percent reported increased malpractice-pressure-induced diagnostic tests; and almost one-third reported increased malpractice-pressureinduced record keeping.48 When asked about the impact of malpractice pressure in terms of its impact on the levels of treatment decisions in their practices, physicians responded even more strongly. Fully seventy-three percent of
physicians, for example, reported that they had ordered diagnostic tests in re44. See supra text following note 33.
45. AMA SMS, 1984 SUPPLEMENTAL SURVEY CODEBOOK.
46. See supra text accompanying note 24.
47. See supra tbl. 3. Rows 1-4 of Table 3 show the percentage of physicians positively reporting
malpractice-induced behavior. Id.
48. See id.
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sponse to malpractice pressure in 1992.49
IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 4 presents our estimates of the impact of reforms on malpractice
pressure for our basic models (1) and (1a). The top panel of Table 4, presenting model (1) results, shows that liability reforms reduce malpractice pressure,
although they do not do so immediately. Indeed, the leftmost two columns of
the table show that the immediate estimated impact of liability reforms on
claims rates Cist and the natural log of malpractice insurance premiums ln(Mist)
is not statistically significantly negative, and in some cases is actually positive.
However, within one year after the passage of direct reforms, the trend in malpractice claims rates in reform states is substantially smaller than the trend in
nonreform states, by 2.07 percentage points; this difference is statistically significant at the five percent level. Indirect reforms, such as caps on contingency
fees and mandatory periodic payments provisions, do not have a statistically
significant effect on claiming behavior, and the impact of one-year lagged indirect reforms on insurance premiums is also insignificant. Within three years after adoption, however, physicians from states adopting direct reforms show
substantially and statistically significant lower trend growth in their real malpractice insurance premiums of approximately 8.4 percent. Indirect reforms do
not have a significant impact on either outcome three years after adoption.

49. See id.
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TABLE 4
EFFECTS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT LIABILITY REFORMS
ON MALPRACTICE PRESSURE, AMA SMS, 1985-1993

Variable

Immediate

1-Year Lagged

3-Year Lagged

Impact Of

Impact Of

Impact Of

Reforms

Reforms

Reforms

Claims
This Year

ln(Premiums)

Claims
This Year

ln(Premiums)

Claims
This Year

ln(Premiums)

Model 1: Effect Of Reforms, Controlling For Specialty And State- And Time-Fixed Effects
Direct
Reforms

-0.0029
(0.0068)

0.0752**
(0.0272)

-0.0207**
(0.0060)

0.0815**
(0.0303)

-0.0208**
(0.0055)

-0.0843**
(0.0336)

Indirect
Reforms

0.0093
(0.0073)

-0.0497*
(0.0291)

-0.0052
(0.0061)

-0.0117
(0.0286)

-0.0008
(0.0053)

-0.0405
(0.0297)

Model 1a: Effect Of Reforms By Specialty, Controlling For
Specialty And State- And Time-Fixed Effects
Direct

-0.0014
(0.0068)

0.0764**
(0.0274)

-0.0194**
(0.0061)

0.0820**
(0.0304)

-0.0206**
(0.0056)

-0.0864**
(0.0337)

0.0090
(0.0073)

-0.0549*
(0.0241)

-0.0053
(0.0061)

-0.0143
(0.0287)

-0.0004
(0.0054)

-0.0446
(0.0298)

OB/Gyn

0.0655**
(0.0093)

1.2624**
(0.0251)

0.0642**
(0.0088)

1.2723**
(0.0249)

0.0618**
(0.0081)

1.2596**
(0.0231)

Direct

-0.0233**
(0.0117)

-0.0217
(0.0354)

-0.0193
(0.0123)

-0.0098
(0.0356)

-0.0044
(0.0142)

0.0317
(0.0414)

0.0016
(0.0111)

0.0728**
(0.0317)

0.0002
(0.0113)

0.0376
(0.0322)

-0.0058
(0.0133)

0.0543
(0.0388)

34,870

25,303

34,870

25,303

34,870

25,303

Reforms
Indirect
Reforms

Reforms*
OB/Gyn
Indirect
Reforms*
OB/Gyn
N

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Observations weighted using AMA SMS sampling weights.
Both models include 14 categorical variables to control for specialty. Malpractice insurance premiums
measured in constant 1985 dollars. Models of the effect of reforms on insurance premiums allow the
estimated time-fixed-effects to vary in reforming and nonreforming states.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level.
** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

The estimated effects of direct reforms represent a substantial change in the
incentives facing physicians.50 The two percentage point decline in claims rates
50. Our estimated effects of direct reforms are larger than, but not inconsistent with, findings from
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in reform relative to nonreform states translates approximately into a twentyfour percent decline (2.08/8.57) relative to the 1985 baseline average claims
rate. Similarly, whereas physicians from nonreforming states experienced real
malpractice insurance premium increases over the 1985 to 1993 period, physicians from reforming states experienced slight declines.
The estimated time path of the impact of direct reforms shown in the top
panel of Table 4—specifically that the reforms affect claims rates within one
year and insurance premiums within three years—is consistent with other research on the operation of the malpractice liability system. In general, reforms
apply to injuries occurring after their adoption. However, a substantial amount
of time elapses between the occurrence of an alleged injury, the filing of a malpractice claim, the payment of compensation (or the reserving of funds to pay
compensation), and the setting of malpractice insurance rates. For example,
approximately a year-and-a-half on average elapses between the occurrence of
an alleged injury and the notification of a physician’s malpractice insurer; depending on the sample and the state, approximately four years elapse on average between injury and claim closure.51 Thus, a reform adopted in year t could
begin to affect claims rates only in year t + 1, and would be expected to affect
insurance premiums only some years after that. The absence of substantial
long-term effects of indirect reforms is consistent with our previous research.52
The bottom panel of Table 4 provides estimates of the impact of reforms by
specialty from model (1a). The bottom panel confirms that specialties that are
conventionally labeled high-malpractice risk, such as OB/Gyn, are subject to
much higher levels of malpractice pressure. Comparing the fifth row of Table 4
to the sample averages in Table 3 shows that OB/Gyn specialists incur malpractice claims at approximately twice the rate of all physicians on average.53 However, there is no evidence that reforms affect high-risk specialists differently
than they affect physicians generally; coefficients on reform/specialty interaction terms are not statistically significant.
Table 5 begins our analysis of how changes in malpractice pressure influence physician attitudes, based on the merged 1984 and 1992 surveys and models (1’) through (4’). Although direct and indirect reforms do not have statistically significant independent impacts on physicians’ perceptions of the impact

earlier studies. For example, in Patricia Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims:
New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 72 (Spring 1986), the author finds that collateral
source rule reforms reduce claims frequency by 14%. Our standard errors would lead us to accept her
findings. In addition, our estimated effects of direct reforms are larger than that found in Zuckerman
et al., supra note 35, at 175-79. The differences in findings between our study and their study may be
due to the fact that we used data from more recent time periods and used a more flexible modeling
structure, allowing reforms to affect claims rates only with some time lag. Indeed, in models in which
we constrain the reforms to affect claims rates immediately, see Zuckerman et al., supra note 35, at 174
(using same methods), we also estimate the effects of reforms on claims rates to be small and statistically insignificant.
51. See, e.g., Kessler & McClellan, supra note 19; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 26 tbl. 2.4.
52. See, e.g., Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 382.
53. This is consistent with Gonzalez, supra note 43, at 32 tbl. 1, 33 tbl. 2.
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of malpractice pressure (model (1’)), reforms do have a significant impact when
they are grouped together into a unidimensional law reform indicator variable
Lst (models (2’)-(4’)), where Lst = 1 if state s at time t had adopted either a direct or an indirect reform, and Lst = 0 otherwise. Results from the second panel
of the table show that, relative to their counterparts from nonadopting states,
physicians from states adopting reforms report lower growth in malpracticeinduced treatment over the 1984 to 1992 period; the differences in trends in
rates of referrals for consultation and in time spent with patients are statistically significant at the five percent level.
Although these results do not by themselves show that reforms reduce the
prevalence of defensive practices, they do suggest that physician surveys can be
a valid measure of actual behavior. If the baseline levels of referrals and time
spent per patient were above the socially optimal levels, then reforms would
reduce the prevalence of defensive medicine. However, if the baseline levels of
referrals and time spent on patients were at or below the socially optimal levels, then reforms would result in socially inadequate care. Put another way,
without information on patient satisfaction or health outcomes, these results do
not have any efficiency or social welfare implications. However, these results
do show that physician perceptions are consistent with objective measures of
the levels of malpractice pressure created by the liability system, as measured
by the results in Table 4 and in our previous research.
The bottom panels of Table 5 report data on the validity of survey data on
physician perceptions in more detail. Specifically, models (3’) and (4’) estimate
the joint impact of liability reforms and individuals’ malpractice claims histories. Our results clearly suggest that physician surveys may also capture negative feelings about the malpractice system and/or unobserved differences across
physicians, as well as exogenous differences in malpractice pressure due to differences in laws. In both models (3’) and (4’), individual claims history is
strongly correlated with the likelihood of reporting a malpractice-pressureinduced change in each of the four dimensions of practice patterns, even after
holding constant the status of state law reforms. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that more recent claims history has a greater influence on physician perceptions. The impact of a claim last year on perceived changes in
practice patterns is between 1.4 and 2.3 times as great as the impact of a claim
at any point in a physician’s career, depending on the dimension of practice under consideration. Even after controlling for individual physicians’ claims histories, law reforms still have a statistically significant impact on physician perceptions of the malpractice system.
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TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REFORMS AND CLAIMS HISTORY ON PHYSICIAN
PERCEPTIONS OF MALPRACTICE-PRESSURE-INDUCED CHANGES IN PRACTICE
PATTERNS, AMA SMS, 1984 AND 1992
3-Year Lagged Effect Of Reforms On Perceptions Of
Malpractice-Pressure-Induced….
Variable

Record

Diagnostic

Keeping

Tests

Referrals For
Consultation

Time w/
Patients

Model 1’: Effect Of Reforms, Controlling For Specialty And
State- And Time-Fixed Effects
Direct Reforms

-0.0171
(0.0346)

-0.0294
(0.0310)

-0.0425
(0.0327)

-0.0132
(0.0322)

Indirect Reforms

-0.0337
(0.0347)

0.0150
(0.0311)

-0.0329
(0.0328)

-0.0399
(0.0323)

Model 2’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms, Controlling For
Specialty And State- And Time-Fixed Effects
Direct Or Indirect
Reforms

-0.0407
(0.0362)

-0.0229
(0.0324)

-0.0822**
(0.0342)

-0.0677**
(0.0337)

Model 3’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms, Controlling For Malpractice
Claims Last Year, Specialty, And State- And Time-Fixed Effects
Direct Or Indirect
Reforms
Malpractice Claims
This Year

-0.0396
(0.0361)

-0.0220
(0.0323)

-0.0813**
(0.0342)

-0.0667**
(0.0336)

0.1340**
(0.0279)

0.1029**
(0.0250)

0.0982**
(0.0264)

0.1168**
(0.0260)

Model 4’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms, Controlling For Career
Malpractice Claims History, Specialty, And State- And Time-Fixed-Effects
Direct Or Indirect
Reforms

-0.0379
(0.0361)

-0.0208
(0.0323)

-0.0809**
(0.0342)

-0.0662**
(0.0333)

Ever Had Malpractice
Claims

0.0956**
(0.0164)

0.0677**
(0.0147)

0.0433**
(0.0155)

0.0512**
(0.0153)

Note: Based on information from 1984 supplemental and 1992 survey. N= 3,769. Standard errors
in parentheses. All models include 14 categorical variables to control for specialty. Opinion survey
questions in 1992 differ from questions in 1984. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
** Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 6 investigates whether the impact of reforms on reported malpractice-pressure-induced changes in practice patterns varies by specialty or by
claims history. The top panel of the table presents estimates of the impact of
reforms by specialty. Although OB/Gyn specialists experience significantly

KESSLER2.FMT

Page 81: Winter 1997]

04/01/98 8:08 AM

EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE PRESSURE

103

greater levels of malpractice pressure,54 they are not systematically more likely
to report changing practice patterns for that reason, as shown by the results in
the second row of Table 6. Furthermore, as shown in the third row, reforms do
not have a systematic differential effect on OB/Gyn perceptions of the impact
of malpractice pressure. This is consistent with estimates from model (1a) that
show that reforms do not affect objective measures of malpractice pressure
facing OB/Gyn specialists differently than they affect pressure facing physicians generally.
Estimates of the impact of reforms by claims history are consistent across
specifications and provide some evidence on how reforms affect the perceptions of physicians with and without adverse claims histories. Among those
physicians who had a claim filed against them in the previous year, those in
nonreform states report a statistically significant smaller increase in the rate of
referrals for consultation when compared to those in reform states. Relative to
physicians in nonreform states who had a claim filed against them last year,
physicians in reform states who had a claim filed against them last year report a
statistically significantly smaller increase in the rate of referrals for consultation
(model (3a’)); and physicians in reform states who ever had a malpractice claim
filed against them report a statistically significantly smaller increase in recordkeeping, relative to physicians in nonreform states with a claims history (model
(4a’)). These results suggest that actual experiences with the malpractice system have somewhat less dramatic consequences for physician attitudes in states
with malpractice reforms. While it is not possible for us to model explicitly
how one physician’s experience of defending against a malpractice claim influences the perceptions of other physicians in the state who have not had an encounter with the liability system, these results do suggest that malpractice law
reforms change medical practice patterns by changing the nature of the experience of being sued.

54. See tbl.4 supra.
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TABLE 6
EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REFORMS AND CLAIMS HISTORY ON PHYSICIAN
PERCEPTIONS OF MALPRACTICE-INDUCED CHANGES IN PRACTICE PATTERNS,
AMA SMS, 1984 AND 1992
3-Year Lagged Effect Of Reforms On Perceptions Of
Malpractice-Pressure-Induced …
Variable

Record
Keeping

Diagnostic
Tests

Referrals For
Consultation

Time w/
Patients

Model 2a’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms By Specialty, Controlling For Specialty And
State- And Time-Fixed-Effects
Direct Or Indirect
Reforms

-0.0387
(0.0365)

-0.0211
(0.0326)

-0.0897**
(0.0345)

-0.0648*
(0.0339)

OB/Gyn

0.0777*
(0.0466)

0.0000
(0.0416)

-0.1019**
(0.0440)

0.0264
(0.0433)

Direct/Indirect

-0.0274
(0.0584)

-0.0238
(0.0522)

0.1043*
(0.0551)

-0.0404
(0.0542)

Reforms*OB/Gyn

Model 3a’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms By Malpractice Claims Status Last Year,
Controlling For Malpractice Claims Last Year, Specialty, And State- And Time-Fixed-Effects
Direct Or Indirect
Reforms

-0.0378
(0.0365)

-0.0255
(0.0326)

-0.0737**
(0.0345)

-0.0644*
(0.0339)

Claims Last Year

0.1438**
(0.0387)

0.0831**
(0.0346)

0.1410**
(0.0365)

0.1297**
(0.0360)

Direct/Indirect Reform* Claims Last
Year

-0.0204
(0.0553)

0.0409
(0.0495)

-0.0885*
(0.0523)

0.0266
(0.0514)

Model 4a’: Unidimensional Effect Of Reforms By Career Malpractice Claims History,
Controlling For Career Malpractice Claims History, Specialty, State- And Time-Fixed-Effects
Direct Or Indirect

-0.0056
(0.0387)

-0.0194
(0.0347)

-0.0621*
(0.0342)

-0.0554
(0.0361)

Ever Had Claims

0.1307**
(0.0224)

0.0693**
(0.0200)

0.0638**
(0.0264)

0.0630**
(0.0209)

Direct/Indirect Reforms* Had Claims

-0.0720**
(0.0312)

-0.0033
(0.0280)

-0.0420
(0.0296)

-0.0242
(0.0292)

Reforms

Note: Based on information from the 1984 supplemental and 1993 survey. N= 3,769. Standard
errors are in parentheses. All models include 14 categorical variables to control for specialty. Opinion
survey questions in 1992 differ from questions in 1984. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
* Statistically significant at the .10 level.
** Statistically significant at the .05 level.
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V
CONCLUSION
Understanding how and why liability laws and liability reforms alter the
medical treatment decisionmaking process is central to reforming the current
malpractice liability system in this country which neither provides incentives
for physicians to take optimal precautions against patient injury,55 nor reliably
provides compensation to injured patients.56 Survey methods serve a valuable
role in this process because they measure how malpractice pressure affects physician perceptions of appropriate practices, and they thereby capture an important determinant of treatment decisions. However, much of the previous research using survey data in this area has several well-studied drawbacks:
Survey methods are prone to response bias, and survey research has not provided policy-relevant evidence on the impact of specific legal reforms on physician perceptions of the impact of malpractice pressure on practice patterns.
We present four findings. First, in states that have enacted liability reforms
that directly reduce malpractice pressure, physicians face lower growth over
time in malpractice claims rates and in real malpractice insurance premiums.
Second, physicians from reforming states report significant relative declines in
the perceived impact of malpractice pressure on practice patterns. Third, individual physicians’ personal experiences with the malpractice system are a key
determinant of the perceived importance of defensive medicine—physicians
who have had a malpractice claim filed against them, particularly a recent
claim, are more likely to report changes in practices as a result of malpractice
pressure than physicians who have not. Fourth, the impact of individual physicians’ claims experience on perceptions is smaller in reforming than in nonreforming states. Taken together, these results suggest that law reforms affect
physicians’ attitudes, both by reducing the probability of an encounter with the
liability system, and by changing the nature of the experience of being sued for
those physicians who defend against malpractice claims.
These results validate our previous research by illustrating how reforms
change physician incentives. Our 1996 study showed that reforms changed
physician behavior, but it stopped short of investigating the mechanism by
which reforms altered medical practices.57 Our current results, however, indicate that mechanisms commonly cited by physicians in anecdotal reports—
namely the frequency and severity of malpractice claims—may play an important role in fostering defensive medical practices. Reforms appear to affect
practices particularly through their impact on the attitudes of physicians who
experience lawsuits. In this paper, we did not explicitly model why attitudes of
physicians who are sued in states with reforms are less dramatically affected
55. See, e.g., Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 388; Kessler & McClellan, supra note 19;
Kessler & McClellan, supra note 10.
56. See WEILER ET AL., supra note 5, at 139-40; HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra
note 5, exec. summary at 6.
57. See Kessler & McClellan, supra note 12, at 388.
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than attitudes of physicians in states without reforms.58 However, the differences we find here suggest that malpractice claims are less onerous in states
with reforms, providing a foundation for their differential impact on physician
attitudes.
In addition, our results suggest that physician surveys do relate to actual
behavior. The fact that state-level reforms reduce both measures of malpractice pressure and physician perceptions of the impact of malpractice pressure
suggests that survey methods provide valid measures of defensive practices.
Nonetheless, further investigation of the extent to which survey methods are
valid will be a fruitful topic of further research. Because the format of the survey questions regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on practice patterns
changed over time,59 we needed to assume that the impact of the change in the
questions’ terms was uncorrelated with physicians’ personal characteristics and
uncorrelated with geographic area in order to identify the impact of law reforms on relative changes in the rates of reported malpractice-pressure-induced
changes in behavior. Future research might investigate the validity of our assumption, or might seek to replicate our results with comparable survey questions. In addition, our results suggest that physician surveys do, in part, measure negative feelings about the malpractice system, or unobserved differences
across physicians, rather than the targeted issue of the impact of malpractice
pressure on perceptions and practice patterns. Malpractice claims history has a
strong positive correlation with perceived changes in malpractice-pressureinduced changes in practices, and more recent history is more strongly correlated with perceived changes than is less recent history. Future research might
investigate the extent to which these findings represent actual changes in practices, rather than the well-studied problem of response bias.

58. Investigation of this question is in Kessler & McClellan, supra note 19.
59. The 1984 survey asked the question in terms of the impact of changes in pressure on changes in
behavior; the 1992 survey asked the question in terms of the impact of levels of pressure on levels of
behavior.

